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Abstract 
This article examines the evolution of cryptology as a business trait and a distinct, state-regulated 
and controlled profession in sixteenth century Venice. It begins by briefly discussing the 
systematic development of cryptology in the Renaissance. Following an examination of the 
amateur use of codes and ciphers by members of the Venetian merchant and ruling class, and 
subsequently by members of all layers of Venetian society, the article moves on to discuss the 
professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice. This was premised on specialist 
skills formation, a shared professional identity, and an emerging professional ethos. The article 
explores a potential link between the amateur use of cryptology, especially as it had been 
instigated by merchants in the form of merchant-style codes, and its professional use by the 
Venetian authorities, and it adds the profession of the cifrista – the professional cipher secretary 
– to the list of more “conventional” early modern professions.  
 
 
In one of the most widely cited scholarly works on the historical development of cryptology, 
David Kahn argued that the “growth of cryptology resulted directly from the flowering of 
modern diplomacy.”1 While this contention remains the conventional wisdom, it does not 
adequately explain the distinctive course that professional cryptology took in a commercial and 
maritime empire like Renaissance Venice. There, the ruling class, who were actively engaged in 
international trade,2 could not see a distinction between trade and politics, as political affairs 
could affect one’s business and livelihood, and commercial pursuits could have diplomatic 
implications.3 For this reason, protecting vital information though code-words and symbols was 
not an uncommon commercial practice. Andrea Barbarigo, for instance, a renowned Venetian 
merchant, already by the 1430s was using his own cipher for his confidential communication 
with his business agent in the Levant.4 In the early 1500s, Andrea Gritti, a young merchant and 
future Doge of Venice, used commercial jargon as a code,5 in order to send intelligence to his 
motherland from Constantinople.6 The Venetians had even coined a term for this encoding 
                                                          
1 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 108. 
2 See Romano, Patricians and Popolani and bibliography therein. 
3 Sardella, Nouvelles, 90. 
4 The cipher is in ASV, Archivio Grimani-Barbarigo, busta (hereafter b.) 4, Reg. 1, c.158 r.; See also, Lane, I 
mercanti, Illustration 2.  On Barbarigo, see Lane, Andrea Barbarigo. 
5 A code is a method of altering the meaning of a message, while a cipher is a technique that hides the message by 
changing the characters in which it is presented. See Kahn, The Codebreakers, xiii-xv. 
6 Davis, “Shipping and Spying.” A code is a method of altering the meaning of a message, while a cipher is a 




approach, lettere mercantili, that is, “mercantile letters.”7 Yet, the same Venetian ruling class 
that invented amateur ways of concealing trade secrets through “mercantile letters” prompted the 
development of a fully-fledged, state controlled and regulated professional cryptology 
department housed in the Doge’s Palace. What was the link between such commercial 
encryption practices and the professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice?  
In Renaissance Venice, business – that is trade and industry – and statecraft were 
blurringly intertwined. Historical academic literature has overwhelmingly ignored any 
commercial origins of the historical development of cryptology, focusing primarily on the 
gradual increase in complexity and sophistication of ciphers, as they developed through the 
centuries. Indeed, in over 1000 pages of his path-breaking book – a work of gargantuan extent, 
both in chronology and geography – David Kahn offers a sweeping review of cryptology’s 
historical development from ancient times to the present.8 In his discussion of the evolution of 
early modern cryptology, however, Kahn overlooks a significant development of that period: the 
progressive transformation of the discipline from an intellectual activity of a handful of gifted 
individuals in the employ of Italian and European princes, into a state-controlled and regulated 
profession premised on specialist skills formation by means of professional training.  
More specifically, Kahn’s synthetic account of cryptology in the early modern era centres 
on three distinct characteristics: cryptology as an emblem of the intellectual prowess of spirited 
philomaths and polymaths who operated within the broader context of erudition that pervaded 
the Renaissance period; cryptology as an instrument of statecraft, used by governments to protect 
arcana imperii (the secrets of the state); and the gradual sophistication of early modern ciphers.9 
Undoubtedly, the instrumentalization of cryptology for political imperatives intensified in the 
period after the fifteenth century, that saw the systematic development of embassies and, by 
extension, diplomacy.10 It is not accidental, therefore, that scholars who explored the 
development of cryptology in that period, upon whose work Kahn built his own narrative, 
focused on these particular aspects of cryptology.11 A fresh attempt to explore extant archival 
material, however, reveals an overlooked facet of the evolution of cryptology: its systematic 
development into a distinct professional service. 
Combining an analysis of early modern archival material with modern sociological 
concepts and theorizations of professionalization and secrecy, and piecing together scattered 
                                                          
7 See, for example, ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 9, cc.126v.-127r. (26 Jan. 1571). 
8 Kahn, The Codebreakers. 
9 See articles published in the journal Cryptologia. 
10 See the classic work of Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy. For recent revisionist debates, see Lazzarini, 
Communication; Lazzarini, “Renaissance Diplomacy,” in The Italian Renaissance State, eds. Gamberini and 
Lazzarini; Frigo, “‘Small States’”, in Politics and Diplomacy, ed. Frigo; and Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta.” 
11 Amongst the most comprehensive works on early modern cryptology are Cecchetti, “Le Scritture Occulte;” 
Meister, Die Geheimschrift; Kahn, The Codebreakers, esp. chs. 3 and 4. 
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information emanating from the most renowned historical works on the subject, this article 
revisits the history of early modern cryptology and reveals its professionalization, that is, its 
systematic organization and development into a distinct professional service based on “cognitive 
specialization.”12 This service was annexed to the Venetian ducal chancery, the civil service 
organization that housed the Venetian state bureaucracy,13 and oversaw several cryptology 
functions, including cryptography, cryptanalysis, deciphering and, astonishingly, the 
development of a well-defined training and development regime for state cryptologists. As such, 
this article adds the profession of the cifrista – the professional cipher secretary – to the list of 
more “conventional” early modern professions, such as those of the priest, the lawyer, the 
doctor, the secretary, the notary, the accountant, and, of course, the merchant.14  
To this date, aside from a few scholarly accounts that reveal only certain aspects of its 
history,15 no historian has attempted to reconstruct the full picture of the Venetian cryptology 
service. In consequence, our understanding of the systematic professionalization of cryptology 
by the Venetian authorities remains limited. Addressing this lacuna, this article reveals three 
idiosyncratic characteristics that distinguish this service from some of the more rudimentary 
cryptologic pursuits of other early modern states. Firstly, the gradual transformation of 
cryptology from an intellectual pursuit into a state controlled and regulated profession that was 
grounded on ammaestar,16 that is, the mastery of the “difficult and most significant science” of 
cryptology through professional training and development.17  It was also based on mainstream 
human resource practices, such as talent acquisition, recruitment and selection, and performance 
appraisals, amongst others. Secondly, the social construction of the professional identity of the 
cifrista that was premised on inter-generational favouritism and professional isolationism. And 
thirdly, the development of an internal school of professional cryptology, set up for the 
professional training of specialist cryptologists and all other state secretaries whose professional 
responsibilities entailed enciphering and deciphering official documents.  
The article’s main contention is that it is this particular aspect of specialist skills formation 
through continuous professional training, in combination with a nascent professional identity, 
even an incipient professional ethos and philosophy, that signifies the emergence of a stand-
                                                          
12 Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 3.  
13 The historiography on the Venetian ducal chancery is vast. For an overview, see De Vivo, “Ordering the 
Archive;” De Vivo “Cœur de l'Etat.” On a fresh historiographical perspective on chanceries in late medieval and 
early modern Italy, see De Vivo, Guidi, and Silvestri, eds., Archivi e archivisti. 
14 Generally on “learned professions” and professionalization in the early modern period, see O’Day, The 
Professions, 18-43. On professions in Renaissance Italy, see Biow, Doctors; On professional notaries in early 
modern Venice, see Pedanis Fabris, “Veneta Auctoritate Notarius;” On the emergence of professional accounting, 
see Goldthwaite, “The Practice.” The bibliography on professional merchants in the late medieval and early modern 
period is vast. For emblematic case studies, see Lane, Andrea Barbarigo; Lane, I mercanti. 
15 See, for example,  Cecchetti, “Le Scritture;” Pasini, “Delle scritture;”; Preto, I servizi segreti.  
16 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 19, cc. 18v.-19r. (30 July 1636). 
17 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 14, c. 127r. (31 Aug. 1605). 
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alone profession of cryptology in early modern Venice. This was clearly distinct from the widely 
diffused, yet amateur use of codes and ciphers by members of all layers of Venetian society. The 
idiosyncrasy of this amateur approach lied in the use of commercial jargon, as it was pioneered 
by Venetian merchants, to protect secret communication. The article explores the suggestion that 
the amateur use of codes as a mercantile custom, in combination with sixteenth century political 
and economic value judgements may have influenced, even conditioned, the gradual 
professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice.  
The article starts by briefly introducing the broader socio-political context in which the 
professional use of ciphers proliferated. It then examines the amateur use of codes and ciphers 
primarily by members of the Venetian ruling class who were actively involved in international 
trade, and consequently by members of all layers of Venetian society who, schooled in the city’s 
mercantile traditions, used commercial jargon to camouflage clandestine communication. 
Subsequently, the article discusses the systematic evolution and organization of a distinct 
cryptology department, created, managed, and protected by the Venetian government. The article 
concludes with some reflections on a potential link between the mercantile custom of the 
amateur use of ciphers and the professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice.  
 
The Professional Use of Ciphers in the Renaissance 
The proliferation of the professional use of codes and ciphers started in the long Quattrocento, 
the century that saw the methodical systemization of diplomatic activities, both in Italy and in 
Europe.18 The gradual intellectualization of cryptology in that period, that steadily made its way 
through the printing press, was instrumental in this proliferation. More specifically, the 
publication of several cryptologic treatises and manuals penned by Renaissance polymaths, 
including Leon Battista Alberti’s De componendis cifris (1466) and Johannes Trithemius’s 
Polygraphia (1518),19 influenced significantly the transformation of cryptology from an esoteric 
practice to an applied Scientia.20 Of great importance in this process was the publication of Cicco 
Simonetta’s (1474) Regulae extraendis litteras zifferatas sive exempio.21  
Simonetta, a longstanding state secretary in the duchy of Milan, one of the most 
meticulously informed cities in the late medieval period, was one the first professional 
cryptologists to be employed in state administration.22 Especially under Francesco Sforza, “the 
                                                          
18 Lazzarini, Communication. 
19 The work was only published in the vernacular in 1568. 
20 On cryptology as an esoteric practice, see Jütte, The Age of Secrecy. 
21 “Rules for deciphering enciphered documents without a key.” See Perret “Les règles.”  
22 On Simonetta and cryptologists of the Milanese chancery, see Cerioni, La diplomazia Sforzesca; On state 
secretaries in early modern Europe, see the essays in Dover, ed. Secretaries and Statecraft. 
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‘signore di novelle’ par excellence,”23 an efficient network of intelligencers and diplomats 
contributed to steady stream of information for political and diplomatic purposes.24 For this 
reason, Milan pioneered the systematic use of clandestine modes of communication, upon which 
overseas diplomatic missions were based.25 Simonetta was primarily responsible for the 
Milanese secret chancery in the second half of the fifteenth century.26 Likely under his direction, 
the numerous ciphers of the Milanese secret chancery were systematically ordered and classified 
for the benefit of diplomats and military governors of the Sforza.27  
Sophisticated ciphers for diplomatic purposes were in use in the Italian peninsula from the 
beginning of the fifteenth century. Already in 1401, the dispatches from Mantua to the Mantuan 
chancellor Simone de Crema were encrypted through multiple cipher representations, rendering 
the task of codebreaking extremely arduous.28 At the dawn of the sixteenth century, the 
professional operation of ciphers by specialist operatives was, in a way, formally sanctioned by 
the emergence of the term cifrista, the professional cipher secretary. The term seems to have 
been created in Venice,29 and half a century later it was widely used in Rome, where the office of 
Cipher Secretary to the Pontiff was introduced in 1555. The Pope’s first recorded cipher 
secretary was Triphon Benicio de Assisi.30 Still, it was Giovanni and Matteo Argenti, uncle and 
nephew, who between them served five Popes from 1585 to 1591 and from 1591 to 1605 
respectively, that lay claim to fame as Rome’s most renowned cipher secretaries in that period.31  
Professional cipher secretaries were employed in several European princely courts, 
especially those that made part of vast territorial states. Henry III and Henry IV of France found 
their expert code-breaker in the mathematician and lawyer François Viète de la Bigotière (1540-
1603).32 Spain’s systemization of the professional use of ciphers took place primarily under the 
reign of Philip II. Coded diplomatic correspondence was managed in the Despacho Universal, a 
specialist branch of the Secreteria de Stato.33 Eventually, the emergence of Black chambers – the 
                                                          
23 Lazzarini, Communication, 47. 
24 Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta.”  
25 Ibid.  
26 Cerioni, La diplomazia Sforzesca, Vol. 1, xviii-xix. 
27 Ibid., ix-xx.  
28 Kahn, The Codebreakers, 107. On diplomacy in late medieval Mantua, see Frigo, “‘Small States’,” in Politics and 
Diplomacy, ed. Frigo. 
29 Preto, I servizi segreti. 
30 Mollin, Codes, 58. 
31 On Matteo Argenti, see Meister, Die Geheimschrift, 148-170; On Matteo Argenti’s codes, see Villain-Gandossi, 
“Les  dépêches  chiffrées.” 
32 Devos, Les chiffres, 29-30. 
33 On Spanish ciphered correspondence, see Allaire, “Le Décodage,” in Correspondre, ed. Albert. On the ciphers of 




secret rooms where professional cryptologic pursuits took place – from the seventeenth century 
onwards, is suggestive of the systematization of the professional use of ciphers.34 
While historiography has explored the professional use of ciphers in the early modern 
period, the evolution of the discipline from an intellectual activity to a stand-alone and even 
state-regulated profession has received less attention. Two reasons can account for this. Firstly, 
the conventional portrayal of early modern bureaucracies as unsystematic and lacking 
professional specialization.35 Yet, to overwhelmingly dismiss early modern state bureaucracies 
as “unsystematic” because they did not display the high levels of rationality, maturity, and 
sophistication of contemporary ones entails discounting tout court the value of our historical 
understanding of more distant administrative practices on which nascent state bureaucracies were 
premised throughout the early modern period.  
Secondly, early modern codes and ciphers have been deemed rather unsophisticated – by 
contemporary standards – to merit comprehensive study by historians.36 This contention, 
however, fails to account for the systematic proliferation of Black Chambers in several areas of 
central Europe from the seventeenth century onwards, or the widespread diffusion of cryptology 
in eighteen century political practices.37 Surely, cryptology has historical origins and, in order to 
investigate them, it is necessary to zoom out of the narrow focus on the level of complexity (or 
simplicity) of early modern codes and ciphers, in order to explore the political and wider socio-
economic context in which they developed. In the following section, we start from the latter in 
order to understand the socio-economic landscape in which clandestine written communication 
proliferated in that period. For Venice, one of the most potent commercial powers in the early 
modern world, the use of codes and ciphers seems to have been instigated, even sanctioned, by 
merchants, primarily to conceal information that influenced their business affairs.  
 
The Amateur Use of Codes and Ciphers in Early Modern Venice   
As scattered archived information suggests, the use of encryption in the written communication 
of businessmen such as merchants, bankers, and their agents was not uncommon in the medieval 
and early modern period. Tomaso Spinelli, for example, the famed Florentine banker and patron 
of Renaissance architecture, used a cipher to communicate business instructions to his brother,38 
just like the Venetian merchant Andrea Barbarigo did with his business agent Andrea Dolcetto.39 
                                                          
34 The history of Black Chambers is substantial. Amongst others, see Vaillé, Le cabinet noir; De Leeuw, “The Black 
Chamber.”  
35 See, for example, Carter, The Western European Powers. 
36 See, for instance, Buonafalce, “Bellaso’s Reciprocal Ciphers.” 
37 De Leeuw, “Cryptology,” in The History, eds. De Leeuw and Bergstra, 331-332. 
38 Jacks and Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence. 
39 Lane, Andrea Barbarigo. 
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Undeniably, the codes and ciphers used by these individuals were quite rudimentary in nature. 
Yet, they are indicative of the need to protect information that was vital to their business affairs. 
Cryptographic manuals published in that period assert the significance of cryptography for 
merchants, reinforcing the idea that encryption was a significant mercantile custom. Opus 
novum, one of the earliest cryptographic treatises to be published (1526), was, according to its 
author, a book for merchants and anyone else who sought ancient and contemporary encryption 
techniques.40 In it, Jacopo Silvestri proposed methods that could be easily deployed by 
merchants and any men or women who wished to keep their letters, books, and accounts secret.41  
Merchants’ use of codes and ciphers was not only intended to protect trade secrets; it 
undergirded their diplomatic activities. Already from the medieval period, it was customary for 
Italian merchants to be directly or indirectly involved in diplomatic and political affairs.42 
Genoa’s idiosyncrasy, for example, as a major commercial centre with no territorial expansion 
meant that diplomatic negotiations were conducted by mercantile and economic agents, while 
official legates were solicited only for the most formal of occasions.43 Early diplomatic studies 
attributed Italian merchants’ involvement with diplomacy to their dexterity in the art of 
negotiation.44 Yet, the robust research tradition in Italian commercial networks has overlooked 
the diplomatic role of merchants.45 Thus, further research is needed to shed more light on 
mercantile diplomatic activities in the medieval and in the early modern period. Nevertheless, 
Italian merchants’ undisputed diplomatic interventions were so prominent that, as Isabella 
Lazzarini aptly put it, “If there was a lack of ambassadors, there was no lack of merchants.”46 
In the case of Venice, a major commercial entrepôt with territorial expansion over several 
areas of Northern Italy, the Adriatic, and the islands of the Levant, this contention holds great 
merit. Venice’s territorial expansion necessitated the formal organization of the state’s 
diplomatic representation by means of resident ambassadors.47 Still, there were times when 
ambassadors, or the lack of them, called for the diplomatic support of merchants.48 The political 
tribulations of the late Quattrocento, for example, especially in terms of the tumultuous 
Ottoman-Venetian relations, meant that Venice had to rely on her large merchant community in 
                                                          
40 Silvestri, Opus novum, 1526. 
41 Ibid., fol. 13 r. 
42 On the enmeshment of the commercial and diplomatic activities of Italian merchants in the late medieval period, 
see Lazzarini, “I circuiti mercantili,” in Il governo dell’ economia, eds. Tanzini and Tognetti. Specifically on Italy 
and the Iberian Peninsula, see the essays in Tanzini and Tognetti, eds., Il governo dell’economia. On the informative 
nature of merchants’ written communication, see Trivellato, “Merchants’ Letters,” in Correspondence, eds. 
Bethencourt and Egmond.  
43 Shaw, “Genoa,” in The Italian Renaissance State, eds. Gamberini and Lazzarini. 
44 See the classic work of Von Reumont, Della diplomazia. 
45 See, for example, Sapori, Studi di storia economica; Melis, I mercanti italiani. 
46 Lazzarini, Communication, 40. 
47 On Venetian ambassadors, see Queller, The Office. 
48 See, for example, Luzzatto, Studi di storia economica; Lane, I mercanti. 
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Constantinople for both diplomatic representation and intelligence gathering. In the late 1490s, 
in particular, Venice was left without a formal envoy in the Ottoman capital, as the Venetian 
ambassador had been expelled from the city, having been discovered to spy for the Spanish.49 At 
that point in time, the young merchant and future Doge of Venice Andrea Gritti took the reins of 
both commercial and diplomatic negotiations. In 1497 he convinced the Sultan to overturn the 
embargo on grain export that the Ottomans had imposed on Italian merchants in 
Constantinople.50 In 1503 he also successfully negotiated the final details of a peace treaty 
between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.51 His missives to the motherland were overflowing 
with intelligence on the size and moves of the Ottoman fleet. To divert suspicion he coded his 
dispatches in commercial jargon and presented them as business communication instead. Once 
he sent a letter informing the authorities that new products were arriving in Venice from sea and 
land, meaning that the Ottomans were preparing to attack with their fleet and army.52 
The technique of substituting specific words with inconspicuous code-words was a widely 
popular method of encoding called in parabula or the Cicero method.53 According to an 
unpublished cryptologic treatise that the Council of Ten adopted as a training manual for their 
professional cryptologists, the specific use of mercantile jargon that appeared innocuous to the 
unsuspected reader had been in use for centuries.54 The Venetians, who were adept at 
camouflaging information of political nature with commercial jargon, simply termed this 
approach lettere mercantili. So extensive was the use of this cryptographic method amongst 
Venetian merchants that the renowned papal cipher secretary Matteo Argenti went as far as to 
attribute its development and diffusion to the Venetians who,55 as seasoned travellers and dealers 
in both merchandise and news, had developed a flair for inventiveness in secret communication. 
Eventually the Cicero method became widely used not only in Venice but in other parts of 
Europe, including England and France.56 Writing from France, a fervent user of the Cicero 
method was the famed Dalmatian printer and publisher Bonino di Boninis. Between 1494 and 
1554, during the Italian Wars, Di Boninis acted as a spy for the Venetian authorities, working in 
close collaboration with the Venetian ambassador in France.57 While stationed there, he sent 
several encoded missives in the style of “mercantile letters” to Venice reporting on French 
                                                          
49 Davis, “Shipping and Spying.” 
50 Sanudo, I diarii, vol. I, 508. 
51 Lane, Venice. 
52 Davis, “Shipping and Spying,” 101-102. 
53 On the history of the in parabula method, see Couto, “Spying,” in Correspondence, eds. Bethencourt and 
Egmond, 292-294; Strasser, Lingua universalis, 23-25. 
54 ASV, Inquisitori di Stato, b. 1269, fols. 25v.-26r. 
55 Meister, Die Geheimschrift, 92. 
56 On instances of the Cicero method in English letters, see Daybell, The Material Letter, 152-158.  
57 See for, example, ASV, CCX, Dispacci Ambasciatori, b. 9 (2 Feb. 1501); ibid., (30 Apr. 1501). On Bonino di 
Boninis as an informer of the Venetians see Dalla Santa, “Il tipografo.” 
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affairs. One of his letters informed the authorities of prices and dispatches of books from France, 
which, in reality, meant news from that country.58 
Di Boninis’s case suggests that a rather simple encoding technique that was primarily used 
by merchants had started to spill over other layers of Venetian society beyond the merchant 
class, to include foreigners who were either Venetian subjects, emanating from Venetian 
colonies, or others living or trading within the Venetian state. The authorities took advantage of 
these people’s expertise and, on several occasions, tasked them with clandestine missions. The 
well-documented case of the Sephardic Jewish merchant Hayyim Saruk from Thessaloniki is a 
case in point.59 In 1571, during an ongoing war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, the 
Venetian authorities appointed Saruk to travel to Constantinople to spy on “the affairs, designs 
and military equipment of the Turks.”60 For this purpose he was asked to produce a self-made 
codebook made up of 184 code-words, in which he coded the Ottomans as “drugs”, people as 
“money”, and, quite sardonically, the Pope as a “rabbi.”61 His compensation for this mission 
reached the amount of 500 ducats for one year’s work,62 a staggering sum, if we take into 
consideration that over half a century later, the starting salary of a professional cryptanalyst, that 
had remained stagnant for nearly a century, was roughly fifty ducats annually.63 
While emanating from different cultural and social backgrounds, Gritti, a genuine Venetian 
nobleman and merchant, and Di Boninis and Saruk, two well-to-do foreigners who conducted 
their business affairs in the Republic, were proficient in the use of merchant-style codes. Yet, the 
Cicero method was not only reserved for the noble and the prosperous. So diffused had it 
become by the sixteenth century, that it had reached the lowest echelons of Venetian society, 
which comprised the mass of skilled and unskilled manual labourers.64 It seems that in a city 
where pretty much everyone had a service to sell, modes of covert communication were used by 
members of all strata of Venetian society, especially as part of espionage services rendered to the 
Venetian government in exchange for benefits.65 Criminals and convicts were a consistent pool 
from which the Venetian authorities drew information gatherers and amateur spies, primarily on 
account of their audacious personalities,66 or due to their intent to have their punishment 
revoked, or even simply because the government could coerce them into action.  
                                                          
58 Preto, I servizi segreti, 269. 
59 On Saruk, see Arbel, Trading Nations, especially chapters 6 and 7. 
60 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, filza (hereafter f.) 15 (23 Nov. 1571; 30 Dec. 1571). 
61 Ibid. 
62 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 9, c. 189v. (23 Nov 1571).; ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, f. 15, (23 
Nov.; 30 Dec. 1571) 
63 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 19, c. 18r.-v. (14 July 1636). 
64 On Venetian social classes, see Romano, Patricians and Popolani. 
65 See, for example, Iordanou, “What News on the Rialto?” 
66 Preto, I servizi segreti, 247. On amateur agents and “diplomacy from below” in the early modern period, see 
articles in Maartje van Gelder and Tijana Krstić, eds. “Cross-confessional Diplomacy.” 
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One striking example of a banished felon turned secret agent is that of Giovanni Antonio 
Barata. In the early 1570’s, at the break of a war with the Ottomans, the Venetian Republic was 
desperate for information on military developments in the Ottoman capital. Accordingly, Barata 
accepted to have his banishment revoked in exchange for travelling to Constantinople to spy on 
the Turks. Importantly, he was ordered to report back to Venice by means of “mercantile letters.” 
For this reason, he created and presented to the authorities a code-book that was made up of 
terms commonly used by merchants.67 Conscious of his hazardous mission, the Venetian 
authorities took his wife and young children under their wing while he was on duty, relocating 
them from Milan to the Venetian city of Bergamo, and providing them with a monthly stipend, 
which turned into a permanent yearly pension for his widow when, nearly one year later, Barata 
was captured and decapitated in Constantinople.68 
Undeniably, the various users of the Cicero method mentioned here came from different 
cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. Yet, from Andrea Barbarigo and Andrea Gritti in the 
fifteenth century, to Hayim Saruk and Antonio Barata in the sixteenth, it seems that, by the late 
1500s, simple modes of encryption, through the substitution of specific words with 
inconspicuous code-words or symbols, seems to have been diffused to all layers of Venetian 
society, and used by people from all walks of life. This diffusion is manifest in an array of 
contemporaneous publications, ranging from cheap-printed pamphlets and writing manuals,69 to 
mathematically grounded cryptologic treatises. In 1546, for instance, the charlatan Leonardo 
Furlano published a pamphlet on writing in cipher. His intended “readership,” according to his 
work’s title, comprised every faithful Christian, including any illiterate individual who could 
have the work recited at home or in the workshop.70  
It is important to emphasise here that the use of merchant-style codes was a basic and 
rather amateur mode of encryption. The choice of commercial jargon, especially in a commercial 
state like Venice, does not seem to be fortuitous. While the absence of surviving records does not 
allow for an accurate reconstruction of the amateur use of cryptology by the Venetian merchant 
class and its diffusion to members of all social strata in Venice,71 the documented deployment of 
such codes primarily by merchants, the undisputed mention of code-writing as an important 
                                                          
67 ASV, CCX, Lettere Secrete, f. 7 (17 Feb. 1571); ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 9, cc.126v.-127r. (26 Jan. 
1571). 
68 Ibid., c.198r. (15 Dec.1571). 
69 For examples of contemporaneous writing manuals that referred to ciphers and were published in Venice, see 
Furlano, Opera nova; Capaccio, Il secretario. For such publications published in other parts of Italy, see, for 
instance, Fedeli Piccolomini, Della nuoua inuentione; Palatino, Libro nuovo. I am grateful to Alex Bamji and Rosa 
Salzberg for sharing their relevant knowledge with me. 
70 Salzberg, “The Word on the Street,” 341. 
71 The use of codes and ciphers by merchants and tradesmen is, to this day, largely unexplored. Specifically for 
Venice, this can be attributed to the limited number of surviving merchants’ letters in the Venetian state archives. 
See Mackenney, “Letters.” 
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mercantile tool in contemporaneous cryptologic and writing manuals, even the use of the term 
lettere mercantili by the Venetian authorities suggest that in an amateur fashion, cryptology had 
become a mercantile custom in Venice.  
Nevertheless, aside from amateur encoding by means of commercial jargon, sixteenth 
century Venetians were idiosyncratic in their development of a fully-fledged, state controlled and 
regulated professional cryptology department, housed in the Ducal palace, and tasked with the 
cryptography and cryptanalysis of sophisticated substitution ciphers. To this day, no systematic 
attempt has been made to investigate this process of professionalization of Venetian cryptology. 
Exploring it against the context in which it evolved is a long overdue task that might enable us to 
reconsider the distinctive course that professional cryptology took in sixteenth century Venice. 
Before proceeding to this exploration, a brief discussion of the historical development of 
professionalization is in order. 
 
Professionalization in the Early Modern Era 
Professionalization has been defined as the social process of organization of a trade or 
occupation, based on “cognitive specialization.”72 This is distinct from professionalism, a 
disciplinary device that “allows for control at a distance through the construction of ‘appropriate’ 
work identities and conducts.”73 In its fully developed form, professionalization has been 
analysed and discussed by scholars as an outcome of the industrial and urban demands of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.74 The lack of institutional frameworks – aside from the 
church or the university – within which professions developed in the early modern era can 
account for sociologists’ attenuation of that period, when discussing professionalization.75 Yet, 
as an emergent and dynamic phenomenon, professionalization – just like work organization and 
management – was developing long before linguistic terms were coined to describe it, borne out 
of the wider socio-political, intellectual, even religious context of the early modern period.76 
In both qualitative and quantitative studies, sociologists and historians have produced a list 
of the key characteristics of a profession. These include a sense of commitment; an appeal to 
expertise; reliance on both theoretical knowledge and practical skills; a professional ethic; 
internal control and discipline; professional training and development; organization of work and, 
stemming from the latter, a certain degree of autonomy in the workplace and a perceived esprit 
de corps.77 Particular emphasis amongst these characteristics has been cast on the “rise of a 
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system of formal education” that “recognized and superseded apprenticeship.”78 It is important 
to emphasize here that while several of these traits can be traced back to some early modern 
professions, they stem, primarily, from nineteenth century professions, especially in the 
Anglosphere,79 and are not entirely representative of professional traits in the preindustrial era.80 
Studies on early modern professions have focused on two distinct categories: histories of 
individual professions – primarily the “learned” professions, such as the clergy and lawyers; and 
histories of societies with a focus on the learned professions.81 Especially in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the word “profession” was associated with a declaration of service – what 
someone professed to offer – rather a distinct form of work organization. Yet, as certain 
occupations gradually claimed knowledge, expertise, and monopoly, a tacit or more explicit 
discourse on what exactly was professed developed.82 Sociologist Megali Larson identified two 
primary characteristics of early modern professions: their inextricable link to social stratification 
and a “liberal education” based on a combination of classical schooling and practical skills.83  
More specifically, cognitive specialization was almost exclusively reserved for the literate 
elites upon whom specialists relied for their professional existence.84 In this respect, the learned 
professions entailed establishment and social standing.85 This trait was evident in the rise of the 
medical profession,86 but also professions that rendered services to the state and the church, and 
that were predominantly performed by an educated “elite”, as opposed to the mass of labourers. 
As we shall see, the Venetian cipher secretaries were themselves an “elite” of servile 
functionaries, emanating from the social class of the cittadini (citizens), the “secondary elite” in 
the Venetian social hierarchy,87 placed immediately under the patriciate. The distinct 
characteristic of those educated “elites” was service and commitment to the state (or the 
church).88 This was their raison d'être that complemented their need to make a living.89  
 
The Professionalization of Cryptology in Sixteenth Century Venice 
Compared to the composite yet disparate independent espionage networks that most European 
rulers relied upon for intelligence, Venice had created a centrally organized secret service. This 
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service was housed in the Ducal Palace, the headquarters of Venice’s political, diplomatic, and 
intelligence activities, and was overseen by the Council of Ten, the exclusive committee 
responsible for state security.90 As part of its covert operations, the Venetian secret service 
created a full-blown cryptology department that was responsible for the production of ciphers for 
the secret communication of Venetian authorities with overseas formal representatives, as well as 
the successful cryptanalysis of the ciphers produced by the chanceries of foreign rulers.   
The seed for the gradual professionalization of the Venetian cryptologic service was sown 
by a single yet significant event, the appointment of Giovanni Soro as Venice’s official cipher 
secretary in 1505.91 Our knowledge of Soro is fragmented and primarily derives from the daily 
accounts of Marino Sanudo, the astute observer and chronicler of Venice in that period. 
According to Sanudo, Soro enjoyed a fine reputation as one of Italy’s most accomplished 
cryptanalysts. His remarkable ability to break multilingual ciphers was so great that he enjoyed 
an unblemished reputation as an extraordinary professional code-maker and code-breaker.92 So 
widely known was his eminence that even the Pope would frequently send him intercepted 
letters, in the conviction that only he could crack the codes in which they were written. Soro 
nearly always obliged.93 It was most probably due to his numerous accomplishments that Alvise 
Borghi, his assistant and successor, called him “the father of this rarest of virtues.”94 
Giovanni Soro served the Venetian Republic for nearly 40 years, until his death in 1543.95 
During his career, he broke innumerable enemy ciphers for the Venetians, the Florentines, and 
the Papal Court, amongst others.96 In 1539, he produced and presented to the Ten a cryptology 
instruction manual with sections in Italian, Spanish and French, that was deemed by Borghi to be 
more angelic than human in quality.97 The Venetian authorities acknowledged his excellence by 
ensuring he was abundantly compensated for his services. As a result, they granted him several 
pay rises and other concessions throughout his career.98 A year before he died, in 1542, the 
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authorities assigned him two assistants.99 From then on, the Ten kept a minimum of three 
permanent cipher secretaries on the payroll. 
The professionalization of cryptology in sixteenth century Venice was an emergent, 
dynamic, and gradual process that comprised the formal appointment of Soro’s assistants. 
Thereafter, a line of eminent cryptologists found themselves in the employ of the Council of Ten, 
working in the secreto (the Venetian Black Chamber) on the top floor of Venice’s Ducal Palace. 
Their work was conducted under strict laws of secrecy, the breach of which was subject to legal 
sanctions, including the death penalty.100 When he died, Soro was succeeded by four cipher 
secretaries: Alvise Borghi, Giambattista de Ludovici, an engineer named Giovanni, and Zuan 
Francesco Marin,101 who was already working as a state secretary when he was chosen to join 
the team of cifristi in 1544.102 
Zuan Francesco Marin was the most distinguished of the four recruits. His ascent to 
eminence commenced when he succeeded in cracking an extremely complex Spanish code.103 
During his thirty-year career, he gradually rose from the ranks of secretario straordinario 
(extraordinary secretary), the entry level position in a Venetian bureaucrat’s career, to a secretary 
of the Council of Ten.104 This was the second highest ranking position in the hierarchy of the 
Venetian Ducal Chancery, after the post of Cancellier Grande, the great chancellor. The latter 
was the most important office open to members of the cittadini class, who could never aspire to 
prohibitively high posts reserved for patricians, such as the position of the Doge.105 Marin 
occupied the post of cifrista for nearly thirty years, during which he made a name for himself as 
one of Venice’s most distinguished cryptanalysts, breaking countless ciphers in different 
languages, and helping to forestall several state threats.106 
Professional training and development 
In the early 1570’s, Venice suffered a heavy blow by losing Cyprus, one of her most prized 
strongholds in the Mediterranean, to the Ottomans, following earlier heavy losses of its 
territories in the Peloponnese.107 Moreover, between 1575 and 1577 a devastating plague 
deprived the city of one quarter to one third of its population.108 In consequence, most probably 
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for contingency purposes, the Ten deemed it necessary to train and develop their professional 
cryptologists. By that point, the Venetian cryptology service that had been in operation for nearly 
three decades had reached a state of maturation that allowed it to display distinct 
professionalization traits, such as specialist skills formation through systematic training. For this 
reason, the Ten named Zuan Francesco Marin, their most eminent cryptologist, as the new 
recruits’ trainer, due to his natural aptitude to cryptology and his tireless study of the subject.109 
Marin, therefore, became the first known formal trainer in the Venetian school of professional 
cryptology, an in-house training and development regime for novice professional cryptologists. 
His appointment and consequent service as the school’s official instructor categorically refutes 
contemporary scholarly contentions that no systematic “in-door” training and development for 
state cryptologists existed prior to the eighteenth century.110 Moreover, it broadens and deepens 
current debates in business history that portray systemised training and professional skills 
formation as a nineteenth century phenomenon.111  
As they were practically the custodians of the state’s most private secrets, the Venetian 
cipher secretaries underwent a rigorous programme of training and development. This started 
with an entrance examination aimed at determining their aptitude to codebreaking. Passing the 
examination, the novice cipher secretaries would receive instruction in Latin and other languages 
that were vital for the cryptologist’s trade, rhetoric, grammar and calligraphy. Importantly, they 
were expected to study the works of the forefathers of cryptology, including those of Alberti, 
Trithemius, and Giambattista Della Porta.112 The completion of their probation was confirmed 
after they had passed a final, more rigorous examination, in which they were expected to break a 
complex cipher without a key.113 This achievement also entailed a salary increase from four to a 
maximum of ten ducts monthly.114 The Ten emphasized that training was vital, as the end goal 
was not simply the ability to encipher, decipher, and break unknown codes but the cultivation of 
deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the scientia of cryptology.115  
Zuan Francesco Marin did not live long enough to complete his job of training the next 
generation of Venetian cryptologists. He died in 1578, leaving the authorities at a loss as to how 
they could fill this intellectual and professional vacuum, since most of his trainees were too 
inexperienced to take up his role.116 Given the lack of a suitable replacement, the Ten deliberated 
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that what Marin was able to teach orally (con la sua voce) while still in life, he could do so 
through his writings (con la sua scrittura) posthumously. For this reason, the Heads of the Ten 
ordered that Marin’s voluminous writings were consigned to the state, indexed, and deposited in 
a separate casket within their office, hermetically sealed with a key to be kept by the Ten. The 
documents would be made available for consultation to the novice cipher secretaries, who were 
instructed to pay particular attention to the scriptures relating to breaking ciphers. The cifristi 
were granted permission to make copies of Marin’s documents in order to study them at their 
leisure at home. Failure to keep these copies confidential entailed severe sanctions, including the 
death penalty. For this reason, the cifristi were to maintain an inventory of their copies, to be 
stored in a designated casket where all relevant state ciphers were kept.117 
This autodidactic mode of training and professional development was deemed sufficient 
for Zuan Francesco Marin’s team of cryptologists. But when, twenty years later, a fresh intake of 
recruits entered the Venetian cryptology department, a new instructor was sought.118 This was 
found in another eminent Venetian cryptologist, Girolamo Franceschi, who had initially been 
recruited as a prodigy, due to an innovative cipher that he had invented, which was deemed 
impossible to crack without a key.119 In 1596, twenty years into his service, Franceschi was 
appointed to the role of the trainer of the next generation of Venetian cryptologists. Amongst his 
nominated trainees was Piero Amadi, a state secretary who had displayed a natural adeptness at 
ciphers.120 Piero was the son of Agostino Amadi, a Venetian citizen who, in 1588, wrote a 
detailed cryptology manual entitled Delle Ziffre (On Ciphers). Delle Ziffre, which still survives 
in the Venetian State Archives,121 is emblematic of the intellectual superiority of Venetian 
cryptologists. In it, Amadi presented a myriad of ways for the production of ciphers in any 
language imaginable, including Greek, Arabic, Latin, and even the language of the devil, for 
which he provided practical examples.122 In his work he also detailed numerous deciphering 
techniques and several recipes for the production of invisible ink. After his death, his wife 
consigned the manuscript to the Ten, who were so impressed with its level of erudition that they 
decided to adopt it as a training manual for their cryptologists, “so that our young secretaries, 
who wish to be employed in such a noble profession in our service, can be instructed and 
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trained.”123 The delicate and critical nature of the book’s content is most probably the reason 
why it never found its way into print.  
In compensation for his work, the Ten offered Amadi’s two sons two concessions: a 
monthly pension of ten ducats for life, to recompense for the poverty in which the family had 
been reduced after the pater familias’s death;124 and the opportunity for employment in the 
Venetian chancery upon completion of their fifteenth year of age, when a vacancy would be 
made available. It was also deliberated that the two sons would not sit the customary entrance 
examination that aspiring Senate secretaries were subjected to. Instead, they would have to 
undergo the specialist entrance examination intended for aspiring cipher secretaries, in the hope 
that at least one of them would have inherited their father’s natural aptitude to ciphers.125  
This approach to the selection and recruitment of new cifristi denotes a rigid preference 
towards inter-generational favouritism, that is, reserving specific state secretary positions for the 
members of the family of already instated bureaucrats. This was an ordinary approach to 
recruitment employed by the Council of Ten and the Great Chancellor, who oversaw recruitment 
and internal promotions in the Venetian chancery.126  
Recruitment and promotions: Inter-generational favouritism and professional isolationism  
Just like several other services of state bureaucracy in Venice, the profession of the cifrista 
was a family business, passed on from father to son, grand-son or nephew. The case of Zuan 
Francesco Marin was emblematic of this hereditary practice. When, in the late 1570’s, the Ten 
deliberated that Marin was to train the next generation of state cryptologists, they offered him the 
opportunity to name two of the three new recruits. In response, Marin nominated his son Ferigo 
and his nephew Alvise.127 The Ten granted Marin the right to nominate family members due to 
his unmatched proficiency in code-breaking. In essence, they hoped that Marin’s descendants 
might have inherited his natural talent and insatiable appetite for the study of cryptology.  
More specifically, the Ten knew that Ferigo, Marin’s youngest son, had learnt the traits of 
the trade almost by osmosis, having displayed glimpses of his father’s impressive “natural 
inclination” (natural inclinatione) to cryptology from early own. In consequence, they 
deliberated that he was the ideal candidate for the post of the trainee cifrista. Accordingly, Ferigo 
was fast-tracked to the formal entry-level position of an extraordinary secretary without having 
                                                          
123 “[...] si possono andar instruendo et allevando i gioveni della cancelleria nostra che vorrano impiegarsi in 
profession cosi’ nobile per il nostro servitio.”ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 13, cc. 48r.-49 r. (10 March 
1588). 
124 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 13, c. 49r.-v. (16 March 1588). 
125 Ibid. 
126 De Vivo, “Cœur de l'Etat.” 
127 ASV, CX, Deliberazioni Secrete, Reg. 11, cc. 77v.-78r. (25 Jan. 1576). 
18 
 
to sit the customary entrance examination.128 He was to serve in this capacity until the age of 
twenty, when he would be promoted to the next level in the Venetian civil service hierarchy, that 
of an ordinary secretary (secretario ordinario). Five years after that promotion, granted that he 
passed the formal examination of breaking an unknown cipher without a key, he would ascend to 
the respectable position of a secretary of the Senate or of the Collegio.129  
While Ferigo was accelerated to the post of trainee cipher secretary, his cousin Alvise 
Marin had to wait for a year to be appointed.130 This is because, while the Ten would frequently 
headhunt individuals recommended to them, there had to be an opening for a position, usually 
ensuing from the death of an employee. Hence Alvise Marin’s one year wait for a chancery 
vacancy.131 Once they made it into the system, the progression of both young men, as indeed 
most novice recruits in the chancery, was steady but gradual. At the age of twenty Ferigo 
assumed the role of secretario ordinario, which at that point was left vacant due to the death of 
his brother, another Alvise.132 Several years after their appointment, and having long completed 
their formal induction to the post of cipher secretary, both men assumed high level civil service 
posts, Ferigo as Secretary of the Senate and Alvise as an ordinary secretary, having passed the 
examination of breaking a polyalphabetic cipher without a key.133  
Zuan Francesco Marin, his son Ferigo, and his nephew Alvise were not the only members 
of the Marin family to have secured positions in the Venetian chancery. As family trees and 
organizational charts of Venetian secretaries stored in the archives of St Mark’s Library in 
Venice reveal, the Marin family had an established foothold in the Venetian chancery for 
generations. This inter-generational employment trend started with the recruitment of Marin’s 
father, Alvise Marin de Zuane, the founder of the Marin family, as a secretario extraordinario in 
1497.134 Alvise’s brother also served the Venetian chancery as a state secretary between 1498 
and 1515.135 Alvise’s sons, in turn, secured jobs in the Venetian state bureaucracy, as well. 
While his youngest son Ferigo only managed to reach the first rank of secretario extraordinario 
in 1544,136 his eldest son, Zuan Francesco Marin, enjoyed a long and successful career as one of 
the state’s most eminent cryptologists, and eventually assumed the highest ranking state 
secretary position, that of secretary of the Council of Ten.137 Zuan Francesco Marin managed to 
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secure state service positions for his three sons, Alvise, Zuane, and, as we have seen, Ferigo, 
whom Zuan Francesco trained as a cifrista. Due to his success, Ferigo was also allowed to induct 
his own two sons, Zuan Francesco and Antonio, into the Venetian chancery as state 
secretaries.138 Overall, numerous descendants of the Marin family would occupy the posts of 
state secretary or cipher secretary for generations.139 
This inter-generational favouritism was not uncommon in the Venetian chancery.140 It was, 
however, particularly pronounced in Venice’s cryptologic service, that was characterized by 
professional isolationism. Several reasons have been postulated by scholars to account for this 
tendency. The historian Filippo de Vivo offered two plausible explanations. The first is purely 
financial. At a time when the Republic’s finances were depleted by continuous wars and the 
secretaries’ salaries could not always be paid in full, the safeguarding of secretarial posts for 
family members was a means of compensation and staff retention.141 The second reason is socio-
political. Nearly all state secretaries in Venice were recruited from the social class of the citizens, 
who did not have political rights. To compensate for this, but importantly, to secure their loyalty, 
the government reserved exclusive privileges for them, including civil service posts.142 In a 
similar vein, Emrah Safa Gürkan argued that the Ten saw it as incumbent upon themselves to 
provide for the family of deceased civil servants, hoping that their descendants would have 
inherited their skills and talents.143 Inter-generational favouritism, then, was linked to loyalty, 
skills, and knowledge transfer.  
While these soundly argued contentions are plausible and merit serious consideration, 
another explanation for this recruitment pattern ensues, if we consider the significance of secrecy 
for such a specialist domain, and secrecy’s instrumentality in professional identity 
construction.144 Historically, secrecy has been considered amongst the primary functional 
responsibilities of secretaries. It is not accidental that well into the eighteenth century secretaries 
were believed to be by definition keepers of secrets.145 Several scholars, erstwhile and 
contemporary, have taken for granted the secrecy secretaries were bound by. Francesco 
Sansovino, for instance, the versatile scholar and eulogist of Renaissance Venice, described 
secretaries as those who “have eyes and mind, but not a tongue outside of counsel.”146 Historian 
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Douglas Biow called them “deferential, tight-lipped servants.”147 Few scholars, however, have 
endeavoured to explain why and how secrecy was linked to secretaries’ development of 
professional identity.  
To explore this consideration further, some established social theorizations of secrecy must 
be brought into the discussion. Secrecy, as a process, enables the creation of the boundary 
between two separate entities, those in the know and the ignorant others. The exclusivity of 
being in the know, compared to the ignorant others, can boost the sense of distinctive 
inclusiveness in a group and, by extension, cement one’s identification with it.148 Additionally, 
the social aspect of secrecy, that requires and promotes the conscious awareness of the group, 
due to the intention of concealment and boundary construction, can enhance the process of group 
identity creation. The sense of belonging that ensues – the feeling of “‘specialness’ in being a 
lifelong member of a privileged inner circle,” as intelligence scholar Michael Herman describes 
it149 – can potentially augment the need to protect and perpetuate secrecy, so as to maintain the 
group. Secrecy, therefore, creates a dynamic relationship between its agents and becomes both 
the condition and the consequence of the formation of group identity.150 By singling out these 
professionals as the custodians of state secrets and reinforcing the distinctive significance of their 
work with exclusive benefits, the government can be seen as engineering the social construction 
of a professional identity that was premised on secrecy.151 In essence, by reserving specific 
privileges such as civil service posts for these secretaries and their families in exchange for their 
secrecy, the authorities managed to maintain their loyalty and continuous service; indeed, there is 
no known case of betrayal of secrecy on the part of any Venetian cipher secretary who was privy 
to what nowadays would be termed “classified” information. This is indicative of an emergent 
professional ethos. In this respect, secrecy created an on-going relationship between state 
secretaries and the authorities and became both the condition and the consequence of 
professional identity formation and, by extension, loyalty.152  
Corporate control and state regulation 
By the time Ferigo Marin and Girolamo Franceschi had taken the reins of the Venetian 
cryptology department, the discipline’s professionalization had reached a state of maturation that 
rendered it a stand-alone professional service, controlled and regulated by the authorities. In the 
late 1590s, the Ten even proposed the election of a committee of five delegates – all noblemen 
with hereditary rights to statecraft – who were responsible for overseeing and making strategic 
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decisions on the state’s cipher policies. This included selecting the most effective cipher to be 
used by the Venetian authorities and their diplomats.153 The role of the five-member committee 
was particularly relevant when disagreements arose, especially with regard to the quality of in-
house produced ciphers, in which case they were asked to settle disputes and restore order.154   
On the eve of the seventeenth century, the regulation of the Venetian cryptology service 
became even more stringent. In 1605, for example, it came to the Ten’s attention that several of 
the older cipher keys had gone missing and even ended up in the wrong hands. Accordingly, 
both Ferigo Marin and Piero Amadi were summoned to a formal audience with the Heads of the 
Ten, and ordered to set aside all cipher keys already used, and produce new ones that were to be 
distributed to all state envoys. The Ten also deliberated that, for purposes of secrecy and 
security, older keys no longer in use ought to be burnt from time to time. Importantly, Marin and 
Amadi were instructed to create two books – one for the Venetian strongholds in the 
Mediterranean and one for the Venetian colonies in the Italian mainland – in which they would 
clearly register all ciphers and their keys, taking a note of the date and the person to which they 
had been consigned, and the expected return date. Copies of these volumes were to be stored in 
secret locations. The cifristi were also required to work with their doors hermetically closed and 
failure to abide by this rule would result in the forfeit of one year’s salary.155  
In the meantime, as Ferigo Marin’s health was deteriorating rapidly and none of the current 
secretaries had produced sons who were inherently gifted in the art of cryptology, the Cancellier 
Grande was ordered to recruit two more cipher secretaries under the pupillage and mentorship of 
Franceschi and Amadi. Their monthly salary was set at four ducats, to be increased to eight or 
even ten ducats upon completion of their two year probation. Indeed, in November of that year 
two young secretaries were appointed, Giambattista Lionello and Ottavio Medici. When, after 
two years of apprenticeship, they passed the exam of breaking a cipher without a key, their 
salary increased to ten ducats monthly.156 And so, the Venetian cryptology service continued to 
train and develop Venice’s professional cryptologists until the fall of the Republic, routinely 
reserving this precious post for fathers and sons who demonstrated the ability to carry on the 
scientia di cavar le cifre (the science of breaking codes) in a hereditary manner.157 
It is important to emphasize at this stage that, by trying to restore the picture of early 
modern Venice’s professional cryptology service, I do not intend to suggest Venice’s superiority 
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compared to other early modern states.158 While Venice’s precocity in the systematic 
development of ciphers is generally acknowledged in the literature,159 my primary intention has 
been to shed light, not on the deft operation of ciphers by professionals as such, but on the 
development of a distinct, stand-alone profession of cryptology, as it emerged and evolved in the 
Doge’s Palace, the Venetian state’s political nucleus. Future scholarship might expose and 
analyse the professionalization of cryptology in other early modern Italian and European states, 
where codes and ciphers were produced and broken by professional cifristi.160  
 
Final Reflections on Professionalization 
The sixteenth century saw a gradual proliferation of professions primarily due to the urbanization 
of Italian city states that increased the demand for professional expertise.161 Yet, the term 
professione, as used in the early modern period is, to this day, a challenging one to define.162 
According to Baldassare Castiglione’s Il libro del Cortegiano (1528), professione meant, among 
other things, “intellectual labor within a culturally defined discipline, such as priesthood or the 
law,” as well as “the product of any practice that required master-pupil training.”163 In short, it 
was a “polysemic” term, denoting professing one’s faith, ideas, or doctrines; or an intellectual or 
manual occupation.164 By the time Tommaso Garzoni (1549-1589) published his famous treatise 
on “all professions of the world,”165 a distinct “professional mentalité” was giving rise to a whole 
host of claims around professional identity and expertise.166 
In relation to the professional cifrista, one could argue that his role was nothing more than 
a mere subdivision of the established profession of the secretary,167 which entailed, not only the 
routine tasks of writing, copying, and cataloguing documents, but, importantly, the “learned 
rhetorical expertise” of performing such tasks.168 However, according to Andrew Abbott’s 
structural and relational theory of professions, a specific body of work delegated by a profession 
to a subordinate group can generate a new profession. This can happen as the newly delegated 
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body of work embraces novel technical and intellectual developments in order to generate new 
knowledge.169 This is particularly applicable to the profession of the cifrista, whose expert 
knowledge and deftness of ciphers, contingent upon specialist education and training, extended 
beyond the customary intellectual errands of the professional secretary.  
Let us explore this proposition further. In the late 1540s, in his fervent petition to the 
Venetian government for a promotion to the profession of cifrista, the Venetian state secretary 
Alvise Borghi claimed that, while in other domains of intellectual activity the Ancients by far 
surpassed contemporaries, the art of cryptology was an exception to this rule. This was because, 
while several ingenious minds could invent secret ways of writing, the complexity of 
professional cryptology meant that the employ of Princes was accessible to only a few genuine 
professionals.170 For the Council of Ten, what separated the amateurs from the genuine 
professionals was specialist skills formation by means of continuous professional training, which 
was the prerequisite for employment when they sought individuals to enter the service as 
professional cifristi; not talent. Talent and aptitude to cryptology were taken as a given. That was 
the case for Ferigo Marin, who was expected to study under his father, and to continue to upskill 
himself even after his second promotion to an ordinary secretary;171 similar was the case for 
Piero Amadi, who was instructed by Girolamo Franceschi,172 as well as Giambattista Lionello 
and Ottavio Medici, who were, in turn, trained by both Franceschi and Amadi.173 In other words, 
a common educational process, combined with a shared professional identity, even an emerging 
professional ethos and philosophy led to the development of a distinct, stand-alone profession of 
cryptology in sixteenth century Venice.174  
While these distinct traits of a sixteenth century profession are redolent of several of the 
criteria that contemporary sociologists have postulated as key determinants for “modern” 
professions, in my analysis I have intentionally refrained from examining the profession of the 
cifrista against every single one of them. This is because the principles determining professions 
and professionalization in the early modern period are “distinctly at odds with modern 
sociological criteria.”175 Undeniably, some of these principles – such as appeal to expertise, work 
organization, and internal discipline – are emergent in the early modern period. In our historical 
reconstruction of early modern professions, however, we should not ignore the significance of “a 
communal, self-authenticating discourse that both periodically defined and policed […] notion[s] 
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of a particular profession as a meaningful form of work.”176 In absence of documented self-
narratives of cifristi about their sense of professional identity and expertise, Alvise Borghi’s 
notion of the profession of the cifrista, echoing the meaning ascribed to it by the very institution 
that marshalled it into existence, the Council of Ten, offers such a discourse. 
 
Conclusion 
Resembling the closed caste oligarchical structure of the Venetian government, Venice’s 
professional cryptology service blossomed within an interdependent system of inter-generational 
favouritism and professional isolationism. Both these attributes served to promote specialist 
skills formation and familial specialization, with the purpose of safeguarding secrecy and the 
construction of a distinct professional identity, even an incipient professional ethos and 
philosophy. Moreover, Venice’s professional cryptology department flourished alongside a 
wider diffusion of an amateur use of ciphers amongst a variety of members of the Venetian 
society, including merchants. Was there a link between the two?  
It is unquestionable that the professional use of ciphers in Venice proliferated in the wider 
landscape of the systemization of diplomatic activities in the late medieval and early modern 
period.177 From this perspective, there seems to be no direct link between the amateur use of 
codes and ciphers, especially as it had been instigated by merchants in the form of merchant-
style codes, and the professional use of cryptology by “professionals of oral and written 
communication” that were involved in public administration.178 A closer look at the users of 
Venice’s cryptology service, however, might tell a different story. 
Trade and industry, the cornerstones of the Venetian economy throughout the centuries, 
had traditionally been premised on secrecy and efficient intelligence.179 Accordingly, Venetian 
merchants were expected to be competent in secret communication, even if the latter was 
achieved through simple means of encryption. The idiosyncrasy of Venetian merchants hinged 
on the fact that the very individuals that came up with such basic techniques of concealing 
information to protect commercial interests, such as Andrea Barbarigo, emanated from the 
Venetian patriciate, the highest order in the Venetian social hierarchy that comprised the 
Venetian ruling class. As such, Venetian patricians had their feet firmly planted in two 
overlapping worlds: those of trade and politics.180 It is possible, therefore, that the patricians who 
                                                          
176 Ibid., 12. 
177 Lazzarini, Communication; Lazzarini, “Renaissance Diplomacy,” in The Italian Renaissance State, eds. 
Gamberini and Lazzarini; Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta.”  
178 Lazzarini, Communication, 115, 202. 
179 See, for example, Juárez Valero, Venecia. 
180 On the patricians in early modern Venice, see Romano, Patricians and Popolani.  
25 
 
prompted the professionalization of cryptology within the Doge’s palace were the ones who had 
been schooled in a tradition of concealing trade secrets through simple “mercantile letters.”  
While historiography to date has not furnished firm evidence for this hypothesis to ripen 
into certainty, this peculiarity of the Venetian ruling class, that accounts for the enmeshment of 
trade, politics, and diplomacy in early modern Venice, can suggest that the professionalization of 
cryptology in Venice could have been influenced, in a way, by this mercantile custom. If 
anything, it is not accidental that this professionalization process intensified between the 1540s 
and 1570s, when the Venetians were fighting – both through warfare and diplomacy – to protect 
some of their most prized commercial strongholds in the Levant, such as parts of the Morea and 
the island of Cyprus.181 In this respect, while I do not wish to argue that the Venetian homo 
oeconomicus, to use Frederic Lane’s term,182 directly interfered with the professionalization of 
cryptology in Venice, mercantile customs, in combination with sixteenth century political and 
economic value judgements, may have influenced its gradual proliferation. Accordingly, scholars 
could pursue two future research avenues: firstly, the direct or indirect role of early modern 
merchants in the diplomatic or political dealings of governments;183 and secondly, the hitherto 
neglected professional development of clandestine practices as a distinct function of state 
bureaucracies in order to protect economic, aside from political, interests. 
With these thoughts in mind, one final question remains. What can the historical 
reconstruction and exploration of the professional cryptology service of early modern Venice 
confer to the historical study of management, organization, and business practices? Firstly, the 
study of the systematic proliferation of the amateur use of ciphers by traders and merchants, both 
for commercial and diplomatic purposes, can offer significant insights into an aspect of medieval 
and early modern commercial activity that still remains largely unexplored and, thus, awaits 
scholarly attention.184 Secondly, this case study demonstrates that traditional professional 
practices that are associated with business and management, such as specialist skills training and 
specialization, professional identity formation, and regulation came to assume their form in 
unforeseen places, not only in Medieval and Renaissance marketplaces and early modern state 
monopolies of overseas trade, but in burgeoning state bureaucracies, as well. Viewed from this 
perspective, the remit of case studies that the medieval and early modern period can confer to the 
disciplines of business and organizational history could potentially broaden, to include 
managerial and business practices within state administration, in addition to more conventional 
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studies on, for instance, early modern accounting.185 In short, casting our scholarly gaze to the 
early modern era will enable us to uncover a slender yet significant aspect of business and 
organizational history that traces the origins of business and organizations in unlikely places, 
such as churches, monasteries, agricultural estates and, of course, governments.186 
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